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1 Introduction
This paper contributes to the recent literature using complex adaptive systems in the 
social sciences (Marimon, McGra.ttan, and Sargent, 1990; Holland and Miller, 1991) by
generating hypotheses based on the environment in which dynamic adaptive behavior 
occurs in a two-party spatial model of elections. The ma.in result of this paper estab­
lishes a relationship between voters' preferences and the slope of the electoral landscape 
on which political parties adapt. Combining this result with an assumption that more 
gradual slopes make for slower local adaptation (given imperfect, local information) , we
formulate hypotheses relating voters' preferences and the separation, or divergence, of 
party platforms. In this paper, we lend support to these hypotheses through computa­
tional experiments. In a related paper, which we summarize here, we also find empirical 
support for these hypotheses. (Kollman, Miller, a.nd Page, 1994).
This analysis fits within a larger research agenda concerning dynamic models of adap­
tive parties. The research has led to three conclusions: first, that over a series of elections 
adaptive parties will choose moderate platforms with some degree of separation on issues 
(Kollman, Miller, and Page, 1992; Page, Kollman, and Miller, 1992); second, that incum­
bents may win re-election because challengers a.re unable to locate winning platforms; 
and third, that changes in the distributions of voters' preferences may influence electoral 
competition and, consequently, electoral outcomes (Kollman, Miller, and Page, 1993).
These findings are noteworthy not simply because they differ from past theoretical re­
sults but also because they tend to agree with common· wisdom and empirical regularities: 
parties in two-party systems advocate moderate but distinct platforms, incumbents can 
*An early version of this paper was presented at the annual meetings of the American Political Science
Association, Washington D.C. September 2-5 1993. The authors wish to thank Paul Fischbeck and Joe 
Oppenheimer for their comments on that version. The Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics 
and Management Science at Northwestern University and Sun Microsystems are gratefully acknowledged 
for their support. A portion of this work was funded by NSF grants SBR 94-09602, SBR 94-11025, and 
SBR 94- 10948 
1 
be hard to defeat, and some electorates are more difficult for candidates to understand 
than others. 
The purpose of this paper is to develop theoretical underpinnings for a general model 
relating voters' preference distributions and the behavior of adaptive parties in spatial 
elections. Specifically, we relate changes in party platforms (in response to changes in
vote totals) to the distribution of voters' issue strengths, where strength refers to the
degree to which a voter cares about an issue. In doing so, we draw a distinction between 
the actual vote total that a platform receives and its expected vote total based on polling 
information. To simplify the presentation, we incorporate the metaphor of an electoral 
landscape upon which parties move. A platform's popularity can be interpreted as an 
elevation, and parties search for points of high elevation.1 A party's ability to locate 
winning platforms depends upon its adaptive environment: smooth landscapes with steep 
slopes are climbed more easily than rugged landscapes with gradual slopes. 
In the main results of this paper we characterize the slope of the electoral landscape 
as a function of the distribution of voters' preferences. We find, for example, that voters 
with extremist preferences form electoral landscapes with more gradual slopes than do 
voters with centrist preferences. This agrees with our earlier computational findings that 
adaptive parties facing voters with extremist preferences tended to converge to moder­
ate platforms less quickly than parties facing voters with centrist preferences (Kollman,
Miller, and Page, 1993) and with recent empirical work on platform convergence (Koll­
man, Miller, and Page, 1 994). 
The remainder is organized as follows: In section 2, we provide an overview of the 
literature and motivate the use of computational models in the social sciences. In section 
3, we present a basic spatial model of two-party electoral competition and describe the 
search rules for three types of adaptive parties. In section 4, we discuss the formation 
of landscapes, formalize the notions of actual and adaptive landscapes, and measure the 
probability of obtaining an incorrect poll. Section 5 contains the main results. We demon­
strate a relationship between classes of voters' preferences and landscape characteristics. 
In section 6, we corroborate these analytic results with computational experiments and 
summarize empirical findings that also lend support to the hypotheses generated by the 
formal model. The discussion at the end of this paper provides additional intuition about 
our results and discusses potential applications of these techniques. 
2 Background
In his seminal work in the spatial theory of elections, Downs (1957) assumes that voters 
and parties a.re perfectly informed, parties respond optimally to voters' preferences, and 
all citizens participate. Downs demonstrates that if preferences can be characterized by 
distances along a single dimension, then parties in two-party systems converge to the 
1If only parties in real life searched for the high ground! 
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median voter's ideal point. That is, the parties will take virtually identical ideological 
stands. The vast literature on spatial elections subsequent to Downs has extended his 
original model to allow for, among other features, multiple issue dimensions, probabilis­
tic voting, mixed strategies, voter abstention, and multiple parties. In these extended 
models, Downs' basic result holds only under restrictive conditions (Plott, 1967). 
These spatial models of elections also rely on the assumption that voters and candi­
dates have perfect information and computational ability. Even models with imperfect 
information assume that candidates or parties know perfectly the probabilities of others' 
actions or states of the world. Though few positive theorists believe that voters and can­
didates solve problems of such complexity, they accept rational models as benchmarks 
for human and organizational behavior. 
Theories of elections that explicitly incorporate empirical research have relaxed strict 
informational and computational assumptions for voters. According to one set of theo­
ries, voting behavior is a product of sociological predispositions (Campbell, et al., 1960; 
Keith, et al., 1992). For example, many studies of voting behavior assume, or conclude, 
that voters derive their opinions a.bout politics and voting decisions from symbols and 
personal loyalties (Sears, et al., 1979). Candidates, knowing this, try to highlight certain 
characteristics a.bout themselves or their opponents for the purpose of exploiting voters' 
psychological attachments to party symbols, racial groups, or ideologies. Popular discus­
sions about the Willie Horton advertisements of the 1988 campaign assume this type of 
decision-making. 
Alternative theories state that_ voting behavior is based on voters' perceptions and 
experiences of the performance of the economy (Fiorina, 1980; Kramer, 1972). Voters 
need to know little more than their economic situation and the health of the general 
economy to vote informatively. In ea.ch of these theories, voters' behavior is rationally 
based, but it is assumed that voters rely on low- information cues to guide them (Popkin, 
1992). 
Among social scientists there is little doubt that voters have biases and possess in­
complete information, and that these deviations from rational behavior influence electoral 
politics. The starting point for a theory of adaptive party behavior is to assume similar 
limitations, but for political parties. An adaptive political party differs from an opti­
mizing political party in its access to information, its methods of processing information, 
and its ability to reposition itself ideologically based on new information. In our formula­
tion, adaptive parties gather information by commissioning polls of the electorate. They 
neither know, nor a.ct as if they know, the utility .Iunctions of every voter. Our adap­
tive parties rely on heuristics (rules of thumb) to process this information and appeal to 
voters. Finally, maneuvering in a. spatial environment, adaptive parties make only local 
adaptations. They may not scan the entire space and instantly locate at the optimal 
platform. 
Our approach represents a significant but natural departure from the literature in 
that it models parties as adaptive and pa.rt of a dynamic complex system rather than as 
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optimizers in a static framework. There are many benefits to using a complex adaptive 
systems approach to social science2• First, these models allow researchers to explore 
the relationship between optimization and adaptation. A common criticism of attempts 
to relax the rationality assumption is that any single behavioral assumption is ad hoc. 
Computational models allow for the testing of a variety of behavioral models and for 
the discovery of common adaptive strategies. Such flexibility enables one to retain a 
degree of agnosticism as to exactly how adaptive parties respond to information. For 
instance, we need not be wedded to one decision-making rule be it rational choice or 
random search. Second, these models enable the testing of multiple hypotheses about 
the underlying adaptive environment. This is possible because any state of the system 
is fully recoverable. Third, computational models retain a level of logical consistency 
enforced by the computer language, yet they allow tremendous flexibility as described 
above. Finally, these models can be used to test the robustness of theoretical models by 
relaxing sets of assumptions. 
In the context of the theory of democratic elections, computational models are comple­
mentary to both theoretical and empirical studies. Computational modeling can bridge 
theory building and testing-we note that the present formal analysis would never have 
been undertaken had it not been for insights that arose from earlier computational investi­
gations. In this paper, we demonstrate how a theoretical analysis of landscape formation 
explains qualitative computational findings. Furthermore, computational modeling can 
be used to identify testable hypotheses-in this case, about how the distribution of voters' 
preferences may effect rates of party convergence. 
3 A Model of Adaptive Parties
In this section we describe a basic spatial model and the heuristics employed by our 
adaptive parties. The section is divided into three parts. First, we present a spatial 
model in which preferences are determined by both ideal points and strengths on issues. 
Second, we describe an election sequerice. Finally we define the search rules used by the 
adaptive parties.3 
3.1 A Basic Spatial Model 
We assume that each voter attaches both a strength and an ideal position to each of n 
issues. Voter j's strength on issue i, Sji C iR+, measures the issue's relative importance
to the voter. A voter considers an issue of strength zero irrelevant. The ideal position of 
voter j on issue i, Xji C IR, denotes the voter's preferred position on the issue. The utility
to voter j from a party's platform, y E ?Rn, equals the negative of the squared weighted
2See Holland and l\'1iller, 1991, for a more complete discussion of this type of approach. Many of the 
arguments lifted below are excerpted from their paper. 
3For a more complete description, see Kollman, Miller, and Page, 1992. 
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Euclidean distance between the vector of j's ideal positions and the party's platform, 
weighted by the voter's strengths: 
n 
1tj(Y) = - L Sji · (Xji - yi)2. i=l 
We make the standard assumptions that voter j casts a ballot for the party whose 
platform yields the higher utility. \Ve further assume that parties are purely office seek­
ing.4 
We want to compare how variations in the preference distribution effect adaptive 
party competition. vVe consider three types of preferences: 
• Extremist: Voters place more weight on issues on which they have extreme views,
e.g. abortion and gun control.
• Centrist: Voters place more weight on issues on which they have centrist views,
e.g. foreign policy and social security. 
• Independent: Voters' weights on issues are statistically independent of their pre­
ferred positions.
These notions are formalized in section 5. · 
3.2 The Sequence of Elections 
An electoral sequence begins with the creation of two randomly generated, initial party 
platforms. One party is arbitrarily chosen to be the incumbent, whose platform remains 
fixed during the first election. Prior to the first election, there is a campaign in which 
the challenger adapts a new platform. The challenger party gathers information by 
undertaking polls of the electorate and alters its platform in response to the polling 
data. Polls provide a noisy signal of the popularity of proposed platforms. The length 
of a campaign equals the number of polls commissioned by the challenger party. At the 
completion of the campaign, the challenger party selects a platform and the two parties 
stand for election with the winning party becoming the fixed incumbent. 
The losing party then becomes the challenger, and a new ,campaign ensues culminating
in another election. At the completion of each sequence of elections, we measure the 
separation of party platforms, the distances of winning platforms from the party's initial 
platform, and the total utility to the voters of the winning platform. We also monitor 
the percentage of the time that the challenger party wins the election. Adaptive parties 
suffer from limited information and bounded computational abilities, as such they often 
fail to locate winning platforms during their finite campaigns. 
4Kollman, Miller, and Page, 1992, addresses adaptive parties with preferences over policies as well. 
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3.3 Search Techniques 
For reasons mentioned in section 2, we consider various types of adaptive search rules. 
Three algorithms were used: a genetic algorithm, multi-step hillclimbing, and random 
search. Each of the algorithms satisfies two criteria. First, each has been used extensively 
in nonlinear search, so we have some understanding of its strengths and weaknesses. 
Second, each corresponds to a plausible description of how parties may actually select 
candidates and platforms. 
The genetic algorithm ( GA) is by far the most complicated of the three.5  A GA 
begins with a randomly generated population of platforms, in our case twenty platforms, 
and creates new populations by a process tha.t mimics natural evolution. Let p0 be the 
initial population of strings. In our setting, these can be thought of as either separate 
candidates or various platforms for a. mutable candidate. Platforms in the population 
are reproduced based on their relative performances. For example, a platform that fairs 
poorly against the incumbent is not as likely to be reproduced a.s a platform that defeats 
the incumbent. In keeping with the biological metaphor, this can be thought of as 
"survival of the fittest." 6 
Two genetic operators a.re then applied to the platforms that survive reproduction: 
crossover and mutation. The crossover operator pairs platforms and then exchanges their 
positions on a random set of issues. \Ve might think of political candidates borrowing 
ideas from one another during the primary sea.son, or of factions on a platform commit­
tee adopting positions from other proposals. Finally, the mutation operator allows for 
minor platform changes. At the completion of reproduction, crossover, and mutation, 
the population p1 is completed and the GA is iterated. Each application of the GA is
referred to as a generation. The number of generations corresponds to the length of the 
campaign. 
The multi-step hillclimbing algorithm operates on a single platform rather than a 
population. The algorithm takes the party's last position ( in the first election this is 
the initial platform) a.s its starting point, y*. The algorithm has two steps. First, a
new platform y1 is randomly created in a neighborhood of y*. If the new platform is
better, i.e., if it obtains more votes against the incumbent, it becomes y*, otherwise y*
remains unchanged. This process continues until the encl of the campaign. The multi­
step hillclimbing algorithm is intended to represent parties that use polling data to fine 
tune their candidate's platform. 
The random search algorithm begins by randomly creating a number of platforms in 
a neighborhood of the party's current platform. The best platform from this set is then 
selected by the party. The random search algorithm is meant to correspond to parties 
who choose from among a set of volunteers whose platforms are fixed. 
5See Holland (1975) for the origina.l formulation of the genetic algorithm, or Goldberg (1988) for a 
more gentle introduction. 
6 After reproduction there may be multiple copies of the better platforms. 
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4 Landscapes
In the first part of this section, we discuss adaptive party performance with respect to 
landscapes. Then we show how the probability of an incorrect poll depends upon the 
slope of the landscape. 
4.1 Actual and Adaptive Landscapes 
In our model there are two conceptions of landscapes, actual landscapes and adaptive 
landscapes. Note that the percentage of the vote received by the challenger party is a 
function of the preferences of voters and the position of the incumbent party. The ac­
tual landscape consists of the percentage of the vote received by the challenger party at 
each platform, holding everything else constant. If a party is purely office seeking, fully 
informed, free from computational constraints, and free to locate anywhere in ideological 
space, then it would choose the platform of highest elevation, i.e., the platform receiving 
the largest percentage of the vote. Our assumptions that parties have limited infor­
mation about voters' preferences, that they respond to that information using hueristic 
procedures that may not be optimal, and that they can only move locally, may preclude 
locating the optimal platform. Thus, they face an adaptive landscape characterized by 
only local and impe1ject knowledge a.bout the voters. Whereas the actual landscape con­
sists of the actual vote percentages corresponding to all possible platform choices, the 
adaptive landscape consists of the perceived vote percentages of the platforms tested by 
the challenger party through polls. 
An adaptive party's knowledge of the landscape is restricted in two ways. First, the 
vote percentages that parties learn through polling a.re estimates of the actual percent­
ages. Second, the parties do not have estimates of the elevations of all platforms, but 
only of those platforms in the neighborhood of their current platform which they have 
tested. 
To illustrate the distinction between the actual and the adaptive landscapes, consider 
two extreme cases, which we refer to as the Nebraska and Jl.!f ount Fuji landscapes. Note
the topography of Nebraska.. Traveling westward a.cross Nebraska's nearly four hundred 
miles, one might never notice an increase in elevation. In fact, Nebraska rises over forty­
three hundred feet from Oma.ha at its ea.stern edge to to the western gate at Johnson 
township in Kimball County. Suppose that two mountain climbers are placed randomly 
in Nebraska and ... told to Jocate .Nebraska's point Gf highest elevation. Suppose further
that the first climber is outfitted with a precise map of Nebraska's topography and a 
compass and that the second climber is provided with neither. For the first climber, who 
has perfect, global information, the task is accomplished easily. For the second climber, 
whose information is both local and imperfect, the task would be more difficult; the 
Nebraska landscape looks roughly the same everywhere. This climber might be tempted 
to choose the nearest hill, or mound, presuming one exists, or may wander aimlessly. 
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Note that in the scenario just described, the adaptive landscape creates problems for 
the climber as a result of both the local and imperfect nature of the climber's information. 
If a climber possessed global, though imperfect information, i.e., if she perceived slightly 
inaccurate elevations over the entire state, then she would recognize the general elevation 
difference and move westward. If a climber possessed local, but perfect information, she 
would notice Nebraska's gentle tilt and adapt westward as long as she could see beyond 
small local knolls. 
At the other extreme lies the Mount Fuj i landscape, where a single steeply sloped 
peak dominates the topography. If the second climber were to confront such a landscape, 
she could easily scale the steep, single-pea.keel hill even with the information limita­
tions. Neither restriction would prevent her from acting "as if" she had perfect, global 
information and were optimizing. 
These examples suggest that the slope of the actual landscape effects the performance 
of adaptive parties, whose information is both imperfect and local. More generally, as we 
discuss at the encl of the pa.per, this sort of result may hold in other interesting settings. 
4.2 Incorrect Polls 
We can formalize the idea that more subtle slopes slow the rate of adaptation by applying 
elementary statistics to the problem of measuring the difference between proportions of 
populations. Suppose that a party's current platform receives a proportion of the vote 
equal top, and that the platform it is considering receives a proportion of the vote equal 
to q. Suppose further that q > p, i.e., that the new platform leads to a higher proportion
of the vote. Let ps and qs be the sample proportions from simple random samples of
the voters of size n. We are interested in how often the party receives polling data with 
an incorrect signal, namely qs < 1f. The point estimator of concern is ps -qs, which is
approximately normally distributed. Its standard deviation is given by: 
(J' p•-q• = 
p(l -p) q(l -q) 
---
+ . 
n n 
The number of standard deviations a.way from the mean, is given by: 
p-q z = --
The probability that a poll is misleading equals the probability that the mean of 
a standard normal distribution is less than z. Most electoral polls consult between 
six-hundred and two-thousand voters. For the purposes of explanation, suppose that 
n = 800 and that p and q are both near 0.5. A simple calculation shows that O'p•-q• is
approximately equal to 0.025, or 2.5%. A platform adaptation which increased a party's 
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vote total by one-ha.If a percent could easily be misinterpreted. The probability that a 
random poll would show a decrease in vote total equals the probability of being at least 
one-fifth of a standard deviation below zero in a standard normal distribution which is 
approximately 0.42. This example shows that slight differences in vote totals may be 
difficult for parties to recognize. 
5 A Formal Model of Landscape Gradients
In this section, we present a formal analysis of the gradients of landscapes formed by 
centrist, extremist, a.nd circular preferences. \Ve show that extremist preferences form 
landscapes with gradual gradients, that centrist preferences form landscapes with steep 
gradients, and that circular preferences form landscapes with moderate gradients. These 
results agree with previous computa.tiona.l findings a.nd with new findings presented in 
section 5. 
We examine a one dimensiona.l projection onto issue 1 .  Preferences are characterized 
by weighted Euclidean distance. The utility of a. platform x to a voter with an ideal 
platform a and a strength vector s is given by 
n 
U(x ,a ) = - l: si · (xi - ai)2.
i=l 
We make the following assumption a.bout voters' idea.I points: 
(Al) Voter ideal points are uniformly distributed on issue 1 on [-1,1] 
Given this assumption we ca.n formalize the notions of centrist, extremist, and circular 
preferences: 
Centrist Preferences: 
Extremist Preferences: 
Circular Preferences: 
Sj = ( 1- I Clj I) 
Sj = I Clj I 
Si = � 
Note for all types of preferences strengths lie in the interval [ 0,1). We make two further 
assumptions about the distribution of voters' idea.I points: 
(A2) There are infinitely many voters at each ideal point in [- 1,1]. 
Assumption A2 allows us to take integrals at each point on the line, which simpli­
fies the problem. With smaller numbers of agents at each point, the landscape grows 
more rugged due to sampling noise. This ruggedness is precisely what we capture by 
considering adaptive parties. 
(A3) For voters at each ideal point in [-1,1] on issue 1, the utility difference 
between the challenger and the incumbent on the other n - 1 issues (denoted 
by e ) is uniformly distributed on [-b, b] where b > 1.
Assumption A3 appears problematic. Notice that distances on separate issues are 
being summed. Therefore, a more realistic assumption would be normally distributed 
differences. Three comments are in order. First, the assumption of normally distributed 
differences complicates the model to the point of intractability, as we make evident. Sec­
ond, the voters who switch which candidate they prefer based on candidate movements 
on issue 1 have utility differences in (-1 ,  1). If the differences are normally distributed 
with zero mean and high variance, then the uniformity assumption is a reasonable ap­
proximation. Third, as discussed in section .5, computational experiments agree with the
analytical results, so the assumption does not appear too important. 
5.1 Landscape Formation 
We now want to calculate the vote total that the challenger party receives as a function 
of its position on issue 1, x, the incumbent's position, y, and the divergence of opinion on 
other issues, parameterized by b. The challenger's vote total equals the measure of the 
agents whose votes he receives. This vote measure depends upon whether the challenger's 
position on issue 1, x, lies in the upper, U, middle, A1, or lower, L, part of the interval.
See the appendix for a formal characterization of preferences. 
Claim 5 .1 Given y 2'.: 0, the measure of votes that the challenger party located at x 
receives against an incumbent located at y if voters have centrist preferences equals 
pf: see appendix. 
6b - :3x2 + sign(x) · x3 + 3y2 + y3 
c(x, y, b) = 12b 
Therefore the slope of the centrist landscape on issue 1 with respect to the challenger's 
position is given by: 
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Corollary 5.1 
pf: follows directly. 
ac(x, y, b) 
ax 
sign(x) · x2 - 2x
4b 
x E [-1, 1) 
We want to compare this slope to the slopes of landscapes formed by extremist and 
circular preferences. 
Claim 5.2 Given y :2: 0, the measure of votes that the challenger party located at x
receives against an incumbent located at y if voters have extremist preferences equals 
pf: see appendix. 
( 
, . 
b) 
_ 6b - sign( x)
· 
x3 - y3 
e J., y, -' 12b 
Corollary 5.2 The slope of the eJ:tremist landscape on issue 1 with respect to the chal­
lenger's position is given by: 
pf: follows directly. 
ae(x,y,b) 
ax 
-sign( x) · x2 
4b 
x E [-1, 1) 
Finally, we can do the same analysis for circular preferences. 
Claim 5.3 Given y :2: 0, the measure of votes that the challenger party located at x
receives against an incumbent located at y if voters have circular preferences equals 
pf: omitted. 
4b - :z:2 + y2
r(x ·1'/ b) = ----''' Sb 
1 1  
xE[-1,1] 
Corollary 5.3 The slope of a landscape formed by cfrcular preferences on issue 1 with
respect to the challenger's position is given by: 
pf: follows directly. 
Dr(;r,y,b) 
ox 
-x 
4b 
x E [- 1, 1] 
For each type of preferences it is straightforward to show that the measure of votes 
the challenger receives is maximized at x = 0, the median position on issue 1. The votes
the challenger receives as a function of the challenger's position on issue 1 are shown in 
Figure 1. 
5.2 Landscape Comparison 
In this section we make formal claims a.bout the slopes of the landscapes within and 
a.cross preference distributions. 
Claim 5.4 For all three types of preferences the slope is independent of the opponent's 
position on issue 1. 
pf: 
2. 
82r(x, y, b) 
= 
82e(x, y, b) 
= 
o2c(x, y, b) 
= 0
8x8y 8x8y Dxoy 
However, changes in the opponents positions do shift landscapes vertically. See Figure 
Claim 5.5 For all three types of preferences the slope is decreasing in b. 
pf: Consider the case of extremist preferences, 
De(:r, y, h) 
Db 
-e(x,y,b) 
b 
Since e( x, y, b) 2: 0. The other cases are proved similarly. See Figure 3. 
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Claim 5.6 For any (x, y, b) with I x I> 0 the slope of a landscape formed by centrist 
preferences is strictly steepe1· than the slope of a landscape formed by extremist preferences. 
pf: Suffices to show 
I 
oc(x, y, b) 
I 
ox 
> I 
or(x, y, b) 
I 
ox 
x E [ 1,1],x -j. 0
By symmetry the inequality can be rewritten 
which reduces to 
which completes the proof. 
-2a; - x2 x2 
---
> - x E [-1,0) 
4b 4b 
-x2 > x x E [-1,0) 
Claim 5.7 For any (x,y,b) with Ix I> 0 the slope of a landscape formed by centrist 
preferences is strictly steeper than the slope of a landscape formed by circular preferences. 
pf: Suffices to show 
I 
or(�, y, b) I 
ox 
> I 
oe(�, y, b) I 
ox 
x E [-1,1],x -j. 0
By symmetry the iriequa.lity ca.n be rewritten 
which reduces to 
which completes the proof. 
-2x - x2 -x 
4b 
> 4b x E [ -1, 0) 
-a:2 > x :r E [-1, 0 )  
1:3 
Claim 5 .8 Fo1· any ( x, y, b) with I x I> 0 the slope of a landscape formed by circular 
preferences is strictly steeper than the slope of a landscape formed by extremist preferences. 
pf: Suffices to show 
I ar ( x, v, b) I ax > I
ae(x, v, b) I ax xin[-l, 1], x =/. 0
By symmetry the inequality can be rewritten 
which reduces to 
which completes the proof. 
-x x2 
4b > 4b
- .r > x2 
x E [- 1, 0) 
a: E [- 1, 0) 
To summarize these claims, voters with centrist preferences form landscapes with 
steeper slopes than do voters with circular preferences, and voters with circular prefer­
ences form landscapes with steeper slopes than voters with extremist preferences. These 
claims establish a cHrect relationship between the distribution of voters' strengths and 
the slope of electoral landscapes. 
6 Computational Experiments and Empirical Evi­
dence 
This section presents findings from computational experiments similar to those performed 
in Kollman, Miller, and Page ( 199:3). In addition, we summarize empirical findings which 
also corroborate our hypotheses. The following para.meters were used. The electoral 
environment consisted of ten issues. There were 2501 voters in the population and the 
the polls sampled rnnc-lomly drawn subpopulations of size 251.7 
7Similar numbers were found with many other sets of parameters. Qualitatively, the results which we 
report appear to hold irrespective of the part.icular parameter values or the choice of search heuristic. 
Numbers from computational experiments with parties using random search and genetic algorithms 
look similar. The only experiments in which our results did not hold significantly occurred when the 
number of adaptations per elect.ions substantially exceeds the number of issues. For example, if a genetic 
algorithm is run for five hundred iterations with only one issue then the differences are not significant. 
We would argue that with so many adaptations that t.he party might be more accurately thought of as 
fully-informed and optimizing. 
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The correlations between strengths and ideal positions on issues were chosen exactly 
as described in section 5. In Table 1 we present numerical summaries from one hundred 
sets of ten simulated elections with multi-step hill climbing parties which performed forty 
adaptations per elections. 
In the numbers presented here we focus solely on platform convergence. However, in 
computations not shown, we found that the slopes of the landscapes differed significantly 
in the expected directions: centrist preferences formed the steepest sloped landscapes. 
To capture the amount of convergence we rely on two measures: distance to the median 
and platform separation. These numbers are shown in Table 1 . Distance to the median
equals the distance of the incumbent's platform to the platform consisting of the median 
on each individual issue. Table 2 shows the results and difference of means tests which 
find strong support for our hypotheses. \�Te find that parties are furthest from the median 
when the voters are extremist on every issue and nearest when the voters are centrist. 
To account for the possibility that the parties may be converging to a platform p 
different from the median platform and that what we are capturing is the distance from 
p to the median, we also measure platform. separation. Platform separation equals the
Euclidean distance between the incumbent and the challenger's platform at the comple­
tion of an election. These numbers a.re shown in Tables 1 and 3 and further support our 
hypotheses. Together the tests show that parties are both furthest apart and furthest 
from the median when voters preferences a.re extremist. Also, as expected, parties are 
nearest together and closest to the median when voters are centrist. 
The tests just described consider environments in which voter preferences on every 
issue are of one type; they might a.11 be centrist, for example. We might also wonder
what happens when on some issues voters' preferences are centrist, on others preferences 
are circular, and still on others preferences are extremist. Do we see similar phenomena 
within a single election? \Vill adaptive parties adapt similar positions on centrist issues 
and distinct positions on extremist issues? Table 4 presents numerical summaries from 
computational experiments in which there was no correlation between strengths and 
preferences except for on issues one and two. Agents had centrist preferences on issue 
one and extremist preferences on issue two. The numbers show significant differences in 
the separation of parties' platforms on these issues in the expected direction: the parties 
are closer together on issue one, the centrist issue, than on issue two. 
These last computations are especially relevant in considering empirical tests of the 
model. Actual voter preferences will differ in their degree of extremism across issues. 
The relevant question is whether an issue's degree of extre1nism is correlated with the 
separation of the parties on the issue. In a related paper, we test this prediction us­
ing American National Election Study data on party convergence in the United States 
(Kollman, Miller, and Page, 1994). In our specification, a voter's preference on an issue
becomes more extreme as the strength they attach to the issue increases with their ideal 
point's distance from the median voter's ideal point. \Ve employ an OLS model and find 
a significant relationship between the level of extremism and the perceived separation 
of party platforms. The empirica.1 result, though by no means conclusive, lends strong 
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support to our model and gives reason to be optimistic a.bout the use of computational 
models to identify and explain behavioral regularities. 
7 Discuss ion
Our theoretical results suggest that the strength voters attach to issues, if related to vot­
ers' positions on issues, can influence how political parties campaign for elective office. An 
adaptive party may have difficulty finding successful campaign messages if the electorate 
contains a substantial percentage of extremist voters. The slope of the electoral landscape 
may partially explain why some candidates in two-party systems remain extremist, even 
though they might fa.re better with voters if their messages became moderate. Electoral 
landscape characteristics may also help explain why candidates sometimes "grope about" 
searching for the right message to appeal to voters rather than immediately deciding upon 
a policy prescription. 
In this paper, we have advanced the notion of parties searching electoral landscapes 
and suggested that landscape chara.cterists influence adaptive search and, therefore, pol­
icy outcomes. The ma.in result of this pa.per has been to establish a formal relationship 
between voters' preferences and the slope of the electoral landscape. We hypothesized 
that more gradual landscape slopes hinder adaptation, resulting in less responsive parties. 
Finally, we corroborated this hypothesis with computational work. 
In future work it is worth exploring whether the inability of imperfectly and locally 
informed a.gents to recognize gradual slopes has broader application in the social sciences. 
Applications of this idea. may be possible in a. variety of fields. For example, in labor 
economics, income levels depend upon workers' attributes. Attribute space together with 
expected income form a career landscape upon which a.gents can adapt. Would one find, 
for example, that a.long some dimensions the slope is more gradual? Or perhaps the 
landscape is rugged? And would one find the under-accumulation of those attributes?8
Product differentiation models also appear to be a. natural application. The analysis of 
adaptive behavior will be greatly facilitated by the interaction of mathematical, compu­
tational, and empirical studies. 
8Thanks to Daniel Vincent. for suggest.ing this example. 
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Table 1 
Circular Preferences 
election % win dist winner separation 
1 0.82 (0.38) 108.90 (25.82) 50.15 (20.36) 
2 0.45 (0.50) 108.12 (24.83) 40.64 (18.43) 
3 0.57 (0.50) 102.62 (21.84) 33.47 (15.79) 
4 0.57 (0.50) 99.87 (19.07) 27.58 (14.33) 
5 0.50 (0.50) 98.51 (17.64) 23.47 (12.90) 
6 0.47 (0.50) 96. 79 ( 15.37) 20.23 (12.03) 
7 0.46 (0.50) 95.13 (14.54) 17 .05 (10.45) 
8 0.43 (0.50) 94.98 (13.52) 14.63 ( 9.21) 
9 0.40 (0.49) 94.83 (12.26) 12.78 ( 8.53) 
10 0.36 (0.48) 94.:39 ( 11. 75) 11.47 ( 7.80) 
11 0.33 (0.47) 93. 78 (11.25) 10.53 ( 7.17) 
12 . 0.30 (0.46) 9:3.53 (10.33) 9.92 ( 7.01) 
2501 voters, 251 voters in each poll, 10 issues, 500 trials
Centrist Preferences 
election % win dist winner separation 
1 0.90 (0.29) 106. 78 (26.23) 45.55 (18.63) 
2 0.51 (0.50) 103.99 (22.84) 34.26 (15.73) 
3 0.66 (0.47) 100.72 (20.88) 25.93 (13.08) 
4 0.66 (0.48) 98.89 (18.13) 19.99 (11.24) 
5 0.64 (0.48) 96.30 (15.87) 15.45 ( 9.24) 
6 0.59. (0.49) 94.30 ( 14. 27) 12.24 ( 8.01) 
7 0.54 (0.50) 92.96 (11. 77) 9.76 ( 6.65) 
8 0.47 (0.50) 93.05 (10.44) 8.02 ( 5. 75) 
9 0.46 (0.50) 91.30 ( 8.87) 6. 75 ( 4.83) 
10 0.37 (0.48) 92.08 ( 8.50) 5. 79 ( 4.43)
11 0.37 (D.48) 91.66 ( 7.97) 4,-g7 ( 4.02) 
12 0.32 (0.47) 91.:38 ( 7.18) 4.49 ( 3.45) 
2501 vot.ers, 251 voters in each poll, 10 issues, 500 trials
Standard errors of the 500 data point.s are given in parent.hesis. To obtain standard errors of the means, 
we must divide by v'500 
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Extre1nist Preferences 
election %win dist winner separation 
1 0.7:3 (0.44) 113.48 (30.20) 51.44 (20.48) 
2 0.38 (0.48) 110.01 (28.05) 44.26 (19.64) 
3 0.4.S (0.50) 107.02 (25.81) 39.65 (18.00) 
4 0.44 (0.50) 104.39 (24. 72) 35.50 (16.60) 
,5 0.43 (0.49) 101.49 (22 . .S.S) 32.34 (16.09) 
6 0.35 (0.48) 101.16 (21.23) 30.11 (15.23) 
7 0.34 (0.47) 99.96 (20.53) 28.24 (14.34) 
8 0.31 (0.46) 99.21 (18.51) 26.32 (13.44) 
9 o.:3o (0.46) 98.22 (18.36) 24.82 (12.71) 
10 0.32 (OA7) 97 . .58 (17.70) 23.56 (12.79) 
11 0.26 (0.44) 96,.SL! (16.23) 22.43 (12.81) 
12 0.23 (0.42) 9.5.68 ( 1.S.52) 21.72 (12.72) 
2501 voters, 251 voters in each poll, 10 issues, 500 trials
Standard errors of the 500 data points are given in parenthesis. To obtain standard errors of the means,
we must divide by J50Q 
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Preference Type 
Centrist 
Extremist 
Circular 
Difference 
Cent-Circ 
Cent-Ext 
Circ-Ext 
Preference Type 
Centrist 
Extremist 
Circular 
Difference 
Cent-Circ 
Cent-Ext 
Circ-Ext 
Preference Type 
Centrist 
Extremist 
Circular 
Difference 
Cent-Circ 
Cent-Ext 
Circ-Ext 
Table 2 
Distance to Ivieclian of "Tinner 
Multi-Step Hillclimbing Adaptive Parties
200 Trials 
ELECTION 2 
Mean 
26.59 
30.66 
29.50 
T-Stats 
2.945
4. :336 
1. 18.5
ELECTION .s 
Mean 
10.96 
17. :34 
1:3.96 
T-Stats 
4.734 
9 . .558 
4.530 
ELECTION 10 
Mean 
4.71 
9.46 
7. :36 
T-Stats 
7.5.52 
11 . .526 
4.471 
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Preference Type 
Centrist 
Extremist 
Circular 
Difference 
Cent-Circ 
Cent-Ext 
Circ-Ext 
Preference Type 
Centrist 
Extremist 
Circular 
Difference 
Cent-Circ 
Cent-Ext 
Circ-Ext 
Preference Type 
Centrist 
Extremist 
Circula.r 
Difference 
Cent-Circ 
Cent-Ext 
Circ-Ext 
Table 3 
Platform Separation 
Multi-Step Hillclimbing Adaptive Parties 
200 Trials 
ELECTION 2 
Mean 
64.0.5 
75.05 
73.:30 
T-Stats 
:3.056 
3.581 
0.543 
ELECTION 5 
Mean 
30.35 
44.96 
:38.20 
T-Stats 
:3.929 
6.974 
2.9:37 
ELECTION 10 
Mean 
18.:36 
:33.22 
25.95 
T-Stats 
.s.:30:3 
9.065 
4.07.5 
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Table 4 
Party Separation for Centrist vs. Extren1ist Voters' Distribution 
election % win centrist issue extremist issue 
1 0. 76 (0.43) 1.76 (1.30) 1. 77 (1.29)
2 0.44 (0.50) 1.63 (1.22) 1.60 (1.20) 
3 0.54 (0.50) 1.44 (1.11) 1.52 (1.10) 
4 0.49 (0.50) 1.32 (1.04) 1.41 ( 1.04) 
5 0.49 (0.50) 1.19 (0.96) 1.33 (0.98) 
6 0.46 (0 .. 50) 1.09 (0.89) 1.21 (0.97) 
7 0.44 (0.50) 1.00 (0.86) 1.16 (0.95) 
8 0.38 (0.49) 0.94 (0.80) 1.10 (0.89) 
9 0.37 (0.48) 0.87 (0. 79) 1.08 (0.87) 
10 0.31 (0.46) 0.82 (0.70) 1.06 (0.85) 
11  0.31 (0.46) 0. 78 (0.66) 1.04 (0.86) 
12 0.26 (0.44) 0.78 (0.65) 1.03 (0.85) 
2501 vot.ers, 251 voters in each
poll, 10 issues, 500 trials
Standard errors of the 500 data points are given in parenthesis. To obtain standard errors of the means,
we must divide by J505 
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A Appendix 2 
A.1 Preferences 
Without loss of generality we assume that the incumbent's position on issue 1 is denoted 
by y in [-1,0) and that the challenger's position on issue 1 is denoted by x in [-1,1]. Recall 
that e denotes the utility difference between the challenger's platform and the incumbent's 
platform on the other (n-1 ) issues. \Ve can now fully characterize preferences on issue 1:
Case U: x E [O, 1) 
a2x 
O�a�x 
y�a<O 
a�y 
Case M: x E [y, OJ 
a20 
x�a�O 
y�a�x 
a�y 
Case L: x E [-1, y] 
a20 
y�a�O 
x�a�y 
a�x 
Centrist Preferences 
voter at a E [-1 , 1]
Utility of Challenger 
(1-a)(a-:r)+e 
( 1  -a)(a; -a)+ e 
( 1  + a)(a: -a)+ e 
(l+a)(a:-a)+e 
(1-a)(a-x)+e 
(l+a)(a-x)+e 
( 1  + a)(a: -a)+ e 
(l+a)(x-a)+e 
(l-a)(a-:-i:)+e 
( 1 + a)( a - :r ) + e 
( 1 + a)( a -:r ) + _e
( 1 + a)( a: -a) + e 
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Utility of Incumbent 
(l-a)(a-y) 
(l-a)(a-y) 
(l+a)(a-y) 
(l+a)(y-a) 
(1-a)(a-y) 
(l+a)(a-y) 
(l+a)(a-y) 
(l+a)(y-a) 
(l-a)(a-y) 
(l+a)(a-y) 
(l+a)(y-a) 
(1 + a)(y -a) 
Case U: x E [O, l]
a::'.'.: x 
0 :S: a :S: x 
y ::; a :S: 0
a ::; y 
Case M: x E [y, O]
a::'.'.: 0 
x :S: a :S: 0
y=S;a=S;x 
a ::; y 
Case L: x E [-1, y]
a::'.'.: 0 
y ::; a :S: 0
x ::; a ::; y
a :S: x 
Extremist Preferences 
voter a.ta E [-1, l] 
Utility of Challenger 
a (a-;r)+e 
a ( x -a ) +e
-a (x- a)+e 
-a(x -a)+ e
a (a - x) + e 
-a (a - x)  + e 
-a ( x -a. ) +e 
-a(x - a)+ e 
a (  a - x)  + e 
-a(a - ;r ) + e 
-a(a - x )  + e 
-a (x - a)+ e 
Utility of Incumbent 
a(a - y) 
a(a - y) 
-a(a - y) 
-a(y - a) 
a (a - y) 
-a(a - y) 
-a (a - y) 
-a(y - a) 
a( a - y) 
-a (a - y) 
-a(y - a ) 
-a(y - a ) 
Circular preferences a.re stra.ightforwa.rcl to cha.ra.cterize: the weight on issue 1 always 
equals 1 /2. To transform the extremist preferences above to circular preferences, simply 
change the coefficient of the term in ( )'s to 1/2 in a.11 cases. 
A.2 Landscape Formation Proofs 
Claim A.1 Given y � 0, the measure of votes that the challenger party located at x 
receives against an inC'ltm.bent located at y if vote·l's have centrist preferences equals 
6b - 3x
2 
+ sign(x) · x3 + 3y2 + y3
c(x,y,b) = 12b 
The proof consists of three parts. Let uc(x, y,) equal the measure of the voters who vote 
for the challenger party if x � y .. 
11 j(x-y)(l-a) 1 ix j(x+y-
2
a)(a-1) 1
uc(x, y, b) = 
-1 dzda + -
b
dzda 
x -b 4) 0 -b 4 
,' 0 j(
2
a-x-y)(l+a) � _ jy j(y-x)(Ha) �
+1nty bcL..da + bdzda-b 4 -1 -b 4 
Integrating yields: 
6b - ;J:r
2 
+ x3 + 3y
2 
+ y3
uc(:i: y1 b) = ----------, ' 12b 
Let me( x, y, b) equal the measure of the voters who vote for the challenger party if
0 � x � y. 
11 ;·(.1:-y)(l-a) 1 ;·O j(x-y)(a+l) 1
mc(:i:, y, b) = -bdzda + -b
dzda 
0 -b 4 x -b 4 
Integrating yields: 
ly j(
2
a-.r-y)(l+n) 1 jy ;·(y-:i:)(Ha) 1
+ -{��+ -b��X -b L!) -1 -b 4 
l 6b - :3a:
2 
- x3 + :3y
2 
+ y3
mc(:i:, y, i ) = 
12b 
Finally, let lc(x, y, b) equal the measure of voters who vote for the challenger party if
x � 0.
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. , 
-11 1(.1'-y)(l-a) _!__ � 1.Q l(x-y)(a+l) _!__ 
lc(x, y, b) - b
d .. da + 
b
dzda
0 -b 4 x -b 4 
Integrating yields: 
The result follows. 
f,x l(x+y-2a)(l+a) .1 lx l(y-x)(I+a) 1 
+ - �� +  - ��
y -b 4b -1 -b 4b 
6b - 3a:2 - x3 + 3y2 + y3lc(x, y, b) = 
12b 
Claim A.2 Given y 2: 0, the meas·ure of votes that the challenger party located at x 
receives against an incumbent localed al y i;/ voters have e:dremist preferences equals
6b - sign(:i:) · a:3 - y3e(:i:, y, b) = 12b
The proof consists of three parts. Let ue(x, y,) equal the measure of the voters who vote
for the challenger party if x 2: y. 
11 l(a.x-ay) 1 ix 1(2a-x-y)(a.) 1ue(x, y, b) = -
b
dzda + -
b
dzda
X -b L1 Q -b 4 
Integrating yields: 
f,o j(x+y-2a)(2a) 1 jy j(ax-ay) 1 
+ -l dzda + -
b
dzda
y -b 4} -1 -b 4 
6b - :r3 - y3 ue(:r,·:.1 , b) = -----12/J 
Let rne(x, y, b) equal the measure of the voters who vote for the challenger party if
0 :'S x :'Sy. 
!al j(aa,-ay) 1
J
O j(ay-ax) 1
me(x, y, b) = -
b
d::da + -
b
dzda 
0 -b 4 x -b 4 
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Integrating yields: 
111 l(x+11-2a.)(a) 1 111 l(a.x-a.11) 1+ -
b
dzda + -
b
dzda x -b 4 -1 -b 4 
6b + x3 - y3 
me(x,y,b) = 12b 
Finally, let le(x, y, b) equal the measure of voters who vote for the challenger party if
x � 0. 
le(x, y, b) = -b
(a.i-a1l)_d::da + -b(a1l-ax)_dzda1
1 
J . 1 101 . 1 
0 4b ;i_· 4b 
Integrating yields 
The result follows. 
f,J.' 1(2a-;t:-y)(a) .1 lx l(a.x-a11) 1 + -
b
��+ -
b
�� 11 -b 4 -1 -b 4 
6b + :r3 - y3 
le(;r ·y b) = -----'. ' 12b 
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